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The Tangled Web of UGC:
Making Copyright Sense of
User-Generated Content
Daniel Gervais*
ABSTRACT

Even as a mere conceptual cloud, the term "user-generated
content" is useful to discuss the societal shifts in content creation
brought about by the participativeweb and perhaps best epitomized by
the remix phenomenon. This Article considers the copyright aspects of
UGC. On the one hand, the production of UGC may involve both the
right of reproduction and the right of adaptation-theright to prepare
derivative works. On the other hand, defenses against claims of
infringement of these rights typically rely on (transformative)fair use
or the fact that an insubstantial amount (such as a quote) of the
preexisting work was used. One might also rely on another type of fair
use defense-for example, that the second work was used in news
reporting,or, although the case law on this point is still controversial,
that the reproduction was fair use because it made the work more
accessible. While it is clear that creating original content by reusing
preexisting content is nothing new, the focus here is on amateur
creation and reuse and the Article discusses whether the amateur
nature of the content constitutes a new normative vector. The Article
suggests that the first step to find adequate answers is a proper
taxonomy of UGC.
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1

"If I have seen further it is by reading the blogs of giants."

Let me be perfectly clear: there is no such thing as "usergenerated content."
Or is there? If user-generated content (UGC) is defined as
content that is created in whole or in part using tools specific to the
online environment and/or disseminated using such tools, then the
real focus is indeed on content "generated" by Internet users. Even as
a mere "conceptual cloud," the label may be useful to discuss the
societal shifts in content creation brought about by the Internet and
perhaps best epitomized by the remix phenomenon. 2 The shift from a
one-to-many entertainment and information infrastructure to a many1.
The original quote ("If I have seen further it is only by standing on the
shoulders of giants") is usually attributed to Sir Isaac Newton in a letter to Robert Hooke
dated Feb. 5, 1676. It is cited, inter alia, in Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders
of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29, 29 (1991),
though one author traced the aphorism to Bernard de Chartres in the twelfth century. See
ROBERT K. MERTON, ON THE SHOULDERS OF GIANTS: THE POST-ITALIANATE EDITION.

(Univ. of Chicago Press 1993).
2.

See LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE IN THE

HYBRID ECONOMY 28 (Penguin Press 2008) Lessig compares the "Read/Write Culture" and
the increasing tendency to make works available as "Read-Only," and notes that citizens
"add to the culture they read by creating and re-creating the culture around them ....
Culture in this world is flat; it is shared person to person." Id. (internal citations omitted).
Using the Internet and other digital tools, "users" of digital content can thus create and
recreate using preexisting content, giving life to the "remix" culture. See id.

2009]

TANGLED WEB OF UGC

to-many infrastructure has deep consequences on many levels. It has
made possible on a massive scale content such as fan fiction, mashups,
music remixes, cloud computing, and collages; blogs have transformed
access to, and arguably the nature of, information.
Against this backdrop, I will take an existentialist view of
UGC, rather than hypothesize its essence: it exists because people say
that it does 3 -even though the constellation of different types of
content that it covers seriously challenges any attempt at definitional
rigor. From that perspective, it is now widely accepted that there is
4
such a thing as the "participative web," or Web 2.0 (soon to be 3.0).
These terms refer to an Internet-based network of content and
services that use increasingly intelligent software capable of
empowering Internet users to develop, rate, collaborate on, and
distribute content, as well as to customize Internet applications. As
the Internet becomes more embedded in peoples' lives, they draw on
new Internet applications to express themselves through content that
they upload or make available. Life stories are written on Facebook
as they happen.
This short contribution focuses on one facet of this complex
phenomenon, namely copyright. This Article's aim is admittedly
modest, yet by no means simple: to examine the source of tension
within the copyright system.
This will require an appropriate
taxonomy and a look at some rather vague notions of copyright law.
The production of UGC may involve both the right of
reproduction and the right of adaptation-for example, the right to
prepare derivative works contained in 17 U.S.C. § 106(2). Defenses
against claims of infringement of these rights typically rely on one of
the following fact patterns. 5 First, if the junior, or second, work is a
fixed, original work based on one or more preexisting, copyrightprotected works (such as a typical derivative work), one could argue,
from the Campbell v. Acuff-Rose perspective, 6 that the second work is

3.
I thus use "existentialist" somewhat loosely to signify that UGC exists in the
eyes of the Other.

4.
TIMES,

See John Markoff, Entrepreneurs See a Web Guided by Common Sense, N.Y.
Nov.

12,

2006,

available

at

http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/12Ibusiness

/12web.html?pagewanted=l&ei=5088&en=254d697964cedc62&ex=1320987600 ("Their goal
is to add a layer of meaning on top of the existing web that would make it less of a catalog
and more of a guide-and even provide the foundation for systems that can reason in a
human fashion. That level of artificial intelligence, with machines doing the thinking
instead of simply following commands, has eluded researchers for more than half a
century. Referred to as Web 3.0, the effort is in its infancy .... ).
5.
I am assuming, of course, that the allegedly infringed work is still copyrightprotected.
6.
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
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a (transformative) fair use. Alternatively, depending on the facts of
the case, one could argue that it is a fair use or otherwise does not
infringe the right of reproduction because only an insubstantial7
amount (such as a quote) of the senior, or preexisting, work was used.
One might also rely on another type of fair use defense-for example,
that the second work was used in news reporting,8 or, although the
case law on this point is still controversial, that the reproduction was
fair use because it made the work more accessible. 9
Most commentaries about UGC, including some of those
contained in this issue of the Vanderbilt Journalof Entertainment and
Technology Law, 10 focus on amateur creation and reuse. At first
glance, this does not, in itself, warrant extensive new prescriptive
analyses. It is abundantly clear that creating original content by
reusing preexisting content is nothing new. Many Walt Disney
productions are based on medieval fairy tales, and countless
Nor should
screenplays are adaptations of novels and plays."
a
fundamental
be
others
of
works
commercial works based upon
problem for theories that have traditionally undergirded copyright. Is
the fact that UGC is amateur content a new normative vector to
consider?
After all, reuse should not be a major source of doctrinal
tension. Most copyright theories support reuse. If I may be allowed a
few analytical shortcuts, one could even say that natural rights theory
supports reuse. After all, John Locke based his theory of property on
transformative labor. 12 Locke was referring to what one takes from
See, e.g., New Era Publ'ns, Int'l v. Carol Publ'g Group, 904 F.2d 152, 155, 1587.
59 (2d Cir. 1990).
See, e.g., Nunez v. Caribbean Int'l News Corp., 235 F.3d 18, 21-23 (1st Cir.
8.
2000).
See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701 (9th Cir. 2007); see
9.
infra Part III.
See, e.g., Debora Halbert, Mass Culture and the Culture of the Masses: A
10.
Manifesto for User-GeneratedRights, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH L. 921 (2009); Steven A.
Hetcher, Hume's Penguin, or, Yochai Benkler and the Nature of Peer Production, 11 VAND.
J. ENT. & TECH L. 963 (2009); Mary W. S. Wong, "Transformative"User-GeneratedContent
in Copyright Law: Infringing Derivative Works or Fair Use?, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH L.

1075 (2009).
For example, the Disney movies Cinderella, Sleeping Beauty, and Snow White
11.
are based on fairy tales by the Brothers Grimm. See JACOB GRIMM & WILHELM GRIMM,
THE COMPLETE FAIRY TALES OF THE BROTHERS GRIMM (3rd ed., 2003). The film version of

Gone With the Wind is based on the book by Margaret Mitchell. See Internet Movie
Database, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt00313810 (last visited Apr. 30, 2009). And the movie
My Fair Lady is based on George Bernard Shaw's play Pygmalion. See Internet Movie
Database, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0058385) (last visited Apr. 30, 2009).
See JOHN LOCKE, Of Civil Government, in Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.
12.
269-78 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1967) (1689); WENDY J. GORDON, A

2009]

TANGLED WEB OF UGC

"nature," of course, and not from other authors. Still, the analogy
between transforming nature and creating literary or artistic works
holds, though only up to a point, due to the investment of skilled labor.
Most authors do not "take from nature"; rather, authors take from
each other and all those who created before them and made their work
available for others to enjoy. Humanity, as Blaise Pascal once said, is
but one person who continually grows. 13 Utilitarianism also supports
reuse, once a proper return has been made possible by a limited
exclusive right: looking at UGC through an instrumentalist lens,
should one not seek the optimal point between protecting the creation
and dissemination of new works and allowing the creativity of others?
In spite of apparent theoretical support and familiarity with
reuse, copyright law is undeniably struggling to cope with UGC. In
Part I, this Article will examine the reasons for this struggle. In Part
II, it will offer a new and simple taxonomy of UGC that better reflects
the types of content in question and may facilitate the application of
copyright principles and norms to such content. Finally, Part III will
look at fair use and the extent to which the doctrine applies to UGC.
I. COPYRIGHT'S STRUGGLE WITH UGC
Copyright is struggling with UGC for many reasons. Some are
qualitative (for example, amateur versus professional users), 14 but
another one is simply quantitative. Hundreds of millions of Internet
users are downloading, altering, mixing, uploading, and/or making
available audio, video, and text content on personal web pages, social
Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of
Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1540 (1993) ("In 1984 the Supreme Court cited

Locke when it held that intangible 'products of an individual's labor and invention' can be
'property' subject to the protection of the Takings Clause. Similarly, other courts have
extended common law protection to intangibles on the Locke-like ground that no entity
should 'reap where it has not sown.' Locke's labor theory of property and allied approaches
have been used so frequently as a justification for creators' ownership rights that Locke's
Two Treatises have been erroneously credited with having developed an explicit defense of
intellectual property ...
Lockean theory deserves a closer examination than the
intellectual property courts have given it so far. Such an examination will show that
Locke's theory has much to reveal about when property in intangibles should not be
granted.") (emphasis in original).
13.
"[T]oute Ia suite des hommes, pendant le cours de tant de si6cles, doit 6tre
consid~r~e comme un m~me homme qui subsiste toujours et qui apprend continuellement."
BLAISE PASCAL, PREFACE POUR LE TRAITE Du VIDE (1651), available at
http://www.paris4.sorbonne.fr/e-cursus/texte/CEC/glelievre/histoire-philo/preface-pour-le
_traite du vide.pdf. Translated, this reads, "So that the whole succession of men, during
the course of many ages, should be considered as a single man who subsists forever and
learns continually." BLAISE PASCAL, PREFACE TO THE TREATISE ON VACUUM (The Harvard

Classics 1909), availableat http://www.bartleby.com/48/3/10.html.
14.
See infra Part I.B.
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sites, or using peer-to-peer technology to allow others to access content
on their computer. 15 The enormity of the task of regulating this
relatively new yet exponentially increasing activity has hit law and
policy like a Category 5 storm. Like a levee, copyright law was
designed to fight identifiable threats, such as commercial pirates, and
allow the marketplace for copyrighted content to organize itself. Will
it hold or is the amount of UGC activity simply too much for
copyright? Looking back at the history of copyright does not provide a
clear answer.
Past may not be prologue here because of the
magnitude and depth of the changes at hand,
A. The Rise of the Nonprofessional User
The English Statute of Anne of 1710,16 often described as the
18
first copyright statute, 17 emerged after the Stationers' Company's
licensing monopoly had expired 19 and stationers, or publishers, were
unable to politically justify a renewal of their publishing monopoly,
which many saw as a form of censorship. 20 The stationers joined
authors in a petition to Parliament in demanding a "copy-right" to be

15.
It is difficult to determine how many Internet users are using the Internet and
which type of content they are trying access, but Internetworldstats.com reported
1,463,632,361 Internet users as of late 2008. World Internet Usage Statistics News and
World Population Stats, http://internetworldstats.com/stats.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2009).
16.
Statute of Anne,
1710,
8 Ann. c.
19
(Eng.), available at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th-century/anne_1710.asp.
17.
There is still a debate as to whether the Statute of Anne was in fact a
"copyright" law. See Brad

SHERMAN & LIONEL BENTLY,

THE MAKING OF MODERN

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE, 1760-1911, 207-08 (Cambridge
Univ. Press 1999); see also Michael W. Carroll, Whose Music Is It Anyway? How We Came
to View Musical Expression As a Form of Property, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1405 (2004); Dan
Rosen, Artists' Moral Rights: A European Evolution, An American Revolution, 2 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 155 (1983); H. C. Streibich, The Moral Right of Ownership to Intellectual
Property: Part I - From the Beginning to the Age of Printing, 6 MEMPHIS ST. L. REV. 1
(1975); Cheryl Swack, Safeguarding Artistic Creation and the Cultural Heritage: A
Comparisonof Droit Moral Between France and the United States, 22 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS
361 (1998).
18.
The Stationers were the equivalent of modern-day publishers. The "Company"
functioned as a guild. They thus licensed publishers who applied to become Members.
Operating under a royal charter, publishers who were not members were not allowed to
publish books in the United Kingdom. See generally MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS:
THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT (Harvard Univ. Press 1993).

19.
As a result, the Company no longer had the power to control who could publish
books. See id.
20.
The Company was considered a form of censorship because people who might
want to publish certain types of content may not be admitted as members, and members of
the Company self-regulated what they could publish, but kept fairly close contact with the
political elite. See Id.
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vested initially in authors but then typically assigned to publishers. 21
This led to Parliament adopting the statute, which granted a fully
assignable fourteen-year copyright monopoly to authors. 22
On the European Continent, after the 1789 French Revolution
and sometime before that in Germany, it became clear that the
purpose of the droit d'auteuror Urheberrecht,2 3 in spite of its roots as a
child of the Enlightenment and its progeny of individual human
rights, was to govern use by and between professionals, including
authors, publishers, and other commercial "exploiters" of copyrighted
content.
For approximately 290 of its nearly 300-year history, the "copyright" was thus traded by way of licenses or assignments among
professionals, including
authors, publishers, producers, and
broadcasters.
It was occasionally enforced against professional
infringers. Only during the past ten years has it routinely been
applied to individual consumers and end-users. 24 This shift is the
source of much of the current tension in the copyright system, and also
that it has greatly increased the level of attention paid to copyright
law and policy.

21.
Id.
22.
As a transitional measure, the statute renewed, for a limited period of time, the
Stationers monopoly. To be complete, in addition to this statutory "copy-right," British
authors also had common law rights to prevent first publication and false attribution. After
a long debate before British courts, it was determined in Donaldson v. Beckett, 98 Eng.
Rep. 257(1774), that there was no residual common law right in published works that could
be used to prevent copying of books after the expiration of the statutory monopoly. British
"copyright" was thus born by merging two quite different approaches: on the one hand,
there was the economically motivated desire of publishers to prevent copying of their books,
and, on the other, the demands of authors to "own" their works, anchored in a natural
rights perspective and based on the Lockean principle that every person should own the
fruits of his or her labor. See id.
23.
These terms, which translate as "authors rights," are the author-centric,
sometimes also referred to as the Romantic version of copyright. The underlying view,
according to which authors invest their personality or their soul on their creative and
intellectual works, was defended by philosophers such as Kant and later Hegel. See Thierry
Joffrain, Deriving A (Moral) Right For Creators,36 TEX. INT'L L.J. 735, 738-9 (2001).
24.
Even though in January 2008 the recording industry announced it would no
longer be filing massive amounts of lawsuits against individual end-users, other lawsuits
and legal uncertainty continues. See Sarah McBride & Ethan Smith, Music Industry to
Abandon
Mass
Suits,
WALL
ST.
J.,
Dec.
29,
2008,
available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122966038836021137.html; Maria Lill.A Montagnani, A New
Interface Between Copyright Law And Technology: How User-GeneratedContent Will Shape
The Future Of Online Distribution,26 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 719, 769 (2009) ("[Ihe
nature of the Internet and the ease with which content on the Internet can be reproduced
and distributed makes all online content, including UGC, particularly susceptible to
copyright infringement.").
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Put differently, while the law has not changed, its target and
purpose seemingly have. 25 This was possible because formally
copyright is designed in terms of restricted acts, that is, acts that can
only be perfomed with authorization of the right holder such as
reproduction, public performance, and so on; there is little, if any,
focus in copyright legislation on the nature or category of users, with a
26
few targeted exceptions.
The transition from a right traded by and enforced against
professionals to a right targeted at individual consumers was not an
easy one. Trading copyright between professionals, or enforcing it
against those same professionals (or professional "pirates"), assumes
that the users were identifiable (i.e., known quantities) and that
normal licensing transactions were possible. In other words, the
market functions because copyright owners contractually grant
authorizations to professional users. In cases where a large number of
professionals use a large repertory of works owned by a plurality of
owners, collective systems exist to allow licensing to hundreds,
sometimes thousands, of users. 2 7 Compulsory licenses sometimes
28
support such systems.
Typically, however, collective licenses are for non-altering uses
and/or integral copying, such as reproduction of sound recordings or
public performance. 29 Collectives do not routinely license the right to
prepare derivative works, at least not on the basis of preexisting

This also explains the emergence of para-copyright norms such as anti25.
circumvention of technological protection measures. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §1201-1204 (2000);

World Intellectual Property Organization Treaty, Apr. 12, 1997, S. TREATY Doc. No. 10517, 2186 U.N.T.S. 152.
See, 17 U.S.C. § 108 (2000), which provides an exception for libraries.
26.
See Daniel Gervais. The Changing Role of Copyright Collectives, in COLLECTIVE
27.
MANAGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS 1 (2006) [hereinafter Gervais, The
ChangingRole].
28.
See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2000) (allowing for the compulsory license for making
and distributing phonorecords).
U.S. copyright law is different from other national copyright laws in many
29.
respects. One of them is the distinction drawn in 17 U.S.C. § 101 between sounds
recordings and phonorecords. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). The former are copyrighted works
"that result from the fixation of a series of musical, spoken, or other sounds, but not
including the sounds accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work, regardless
of the nature of the material objects, such as disks, tapes, or other phonorecords, in which
they are embodied," id., while phonorecords are the material objects in which sounds, other
than those accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work, are fixed. Id.; see also
Daniel J. Gervais, Transmission of Music on the Internet: An Analysis of the Copyright
Laws of Canada,France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States, 34
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1363, 1363-1416 (2001).
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tariffs. 30 Nor have they licensed individual end-users, other than
31
exceptionally.
But now individual Internet users have become "content
providers," even though they are not professionals. Consequently,
rights holders have analogized them to (professional) content
providers and other intermediaries, and have not hesitated to enforce
copyright, a hitherto purely professional right, against those
individual users. However, licensing mechanisms have thus far been
unable to follow. In fact, one potential reason why end-users were
traditionally left out of the copyright equation was the system's
inability to license or integrate those end-users. Digital technology
may be changing this, 32 and could remove the obstacle. However, as
discussed below, there are other reasons, including privacy, to leave
out end-users.
In sum, the inability and/or unwillingness to license end-users,
along with uncertainties about the scope of fair use, are two main
sources of tension in the copyright system. One potential response is
that individual end-users have always been a part of the copyright
equation, or that they have used works on the basis of implied
licenses. After all, the system could not ignore them: is not most
content designed to be viewed, read, or listened to by these users? The
answer is yes, of course, but this does not end the discussion-far from
it.
First, the verbs themselves (view, read, and listen) describe a
passive approach to content and fail to reflect the user empowerment
that digital tools have generated. Second, major copyright holders did

30.
A tariff may be defined for these purposes as a set of licensing conditions,
including a price which may be set on various bases (units produced, user revenue, and so
on), that any qualified user (normally, any person to whom the tariff applies) may invoke
and use a work contained in the repertory of works covered by the tariff according to the
conditions contained therein. Competition (antitrust) law often prevents collectives from
refusing to issue a license based on such a tariff to a qualified user. For example, if a tariff
allows a broadcaster to broadcast a repertory of musical works for a given period of time in
exchange for the payment of a percentage of the broadcaster's advertising revenues, then
any broadcaster who qualifies-this may be determined under other (e.g., broadcasting)
statutes-would be entitled to the license. In the United States, this is "regulated" by
consent decrees negotiated between ASCAP and BMI, on the one hand, and the
Department of Justice on the other. See Glynn Lunney, Copyright Collectives and
Collecting Societies: The United States Experience, in DANIEL GERVAIS, COLLECTIVE
MANAGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS 311, 314-321 (2005).

31.
Copyright Clearance Center, Inc. (CCC) will grant individual users
reproduction
licenses.
See Copyright.com:
The Rights
Licensing
Experts,
www.copyright.com (last visited Apr. 2, 2009). However, collectives have not been in the
business of granting micro-licenses. See Lunney, supra note 30, at 339-340.
32.
One should not belittle the scope of the challenge ahead: millions of users who
do not fit existing user profiles, using systems not equipped to grant them licenses.
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not much care about the impact of copyright on end-users, provided
that they remained just that: end-users. The notion of implied license
was not necessary; most passive uses did not require a license until
the Internet made reproduction a simple process. Rights holders took
notice by trying to keep end-users at the end of the distribution chain
so that they could continue to ignore their copyright footprints, that is,
their impact on the exploitation of copyrighted material.3 3 Third, it is
true that pre-Internet end-users occasionally adapted preexisting
content, but never on the scale of their passive content consumption.
Interactive uses were a small minority, and those responsible for these
individual uses and transformations could not produce multiple
generations of perfect copies.3 4 From a policy standpoint, this was
arguably de minimis use. 35 One impact of the UGC phenomenon is
the exponential rise in the number of individual uses and
transformations of content, and the ability to share and disseminate
content.
B. Private Use or Amateur Use?
The Internet has radically transformed the possibilities of
creation, reproduction, and distribution. Individual users naturally
33.

I am not making an empirical claim, merely a modest anecdotal one. The

dozens of end-user license agreements (EUILAs) I have read tend to limit reuse by endusers and ensure that end-users remain just that: at the end of the distribution chain. One
example is the prohibition to create derivative works, such as in the RealNetworks EULA,
which reads in part as follows: 'You may not . . . modify, translate, reverse engineer,
decompile, disassemble (except to the extent that this restriction is expressly prohibited by
law) or create derivative works based upon the Software or Documentation." (on file with
author).
34.
An example would be music tracks copied on cassette tapes. These "private
compilations" were not authorized by rights holders, even though they may have been fair
use. The website of the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) states: "It's okay
to copy music onto an analog cassette, but not for commercial purposes. It's also okay to
copy music onto special Audio CD-R's, mini-discs, and digital tapes (because royalties have
been paid on them) - but, again, not for commercial purposes." RIAA, The Law,
http://www.riaa.com/physicalpiracy.php?contentselector=piracy_onlinethelaw
(last
visited Apr. 30, 2009). But few right holders tried to prevent the copying because an analog
tape could not produce generations of good-quality copies, as the lack of lawsuits indicates.
When (short-lived) digital audio tapes were introduced, the music industry reacted by
getting Congress to mandate technological locks to prevent second generation copying and
imposing a levy of blank tapes. See Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, 17 U.S.C. §§ 10011010 (2000).
35.
See, e.g., Gordon v. Nextel Commc'ns, 345 F.3d 922, 924 (6th Cir. 2003) ("To
establish that a copyright infringement is de minimis, the alleged infringer must
demonstrate that the copying of the protected material is so trivial 'as to fall below the
quantitative threshold of substantial similarity, which is always a required element of
actionable copying."' (quoting Ringgold v. Black Entm't Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 74 (2d
Cir. 1997)).
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want to harness the enormous capabilities of the Internet to access,
use, and disseminate information and content. The demand is huge
and ever increasing. 36 Technology has responded to this huge pull by
providing the powerful technological means to meet user expectations.
Copyright was not initially designed for routine individual use,
evidenced by the fact that exceptions and limitations in the Copyright
Act were written with the professional user in mind. 37 This explains
why, in several nations' laws, the main copyright exceptions can be
grouped into two categories: first, private use, which governments
previously regarded as "unregulatable" as a practical matter, 38 and
where copyright law thus abdicated its authority; and second, specific
uses by professional intermediaries such as libraries, schools, courts,
and sometimes the government itself. 39
Regarding the former
category, today there are still several very broad exceptions for
"private use" (for example, in Italy and Japan). 40 End-users have

36.
Richard Stallman wrote a perceptive piece in 1996:
The Internet is relevant because it facilitates copying and sharing of writings by
ordinary readers. The easier it is to copy and share, the more useful it becomes,
and the more copyright as it stands now becomes a bad deal. This analysis also
explains why it makes sense for the Grateful Dead to insist on copyright for CD
manufacturing but not for individual copying. CD production works like the
printing press; it is not feasible today for ordinary people, even computer owners,
to copy a CD into another CD. Thus copyright for publishing CDs of music
remains painless for music listeners, just as all copyright was painless in the age
of the printing press. To restrict copying the same music onto a digital audio tape
does hurt the listeners, however, and they are entitled to reject this restriction.
We can also see why the abstractness of intellectual property is not the crucial
factor. Other forms of abstract property represent shares of something. Copying
any kind of share is intrinsically a zero-sum activity; the person who copies
benefits only by taking wealth away from everyone else. Copying a dollar bill in a
color copier is effectively equivalent to shaving a small fraction off of every other
dollar and adding these fractions together to make one dollar. Naturally, we
consider this wrong. By contrast, copying useful, enlightening or entertaining
information for a friend makes the world happier and better off; it benefits the
friend and inherently hurts no one. It is a constructive activity that strengthens
social bonds.
Richard Stallman, Reevaluating Copyright: The Public Must Prevail, 75 OR. L. REV. 291,
294 (1996).
37.
For example, see section 108, which deals with libraries, and the compulsory
license in section 115 for phonorecords. 17 U.S.C. §§ 108, 115 (2000).
38.
Professor Alain Strowel considers the defense of the private sphere as one of the
three main justifications for exceptions to copyright, the other two being circulation of
information and cultural and scientific development. See Alain Strowel, Droit d'auteur et
acc~s & l'information: de quelques malentendus et vrais probl~mes a travers l'historie et les
ddveloppements rdcents, 12 CAHIERS DE PROPRIETE INTELLECTUELLE 185, 198 (1999).
39.
See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 108 (2000).
40.
The result of those exceptions is expressed as a combination of chattel rights of
the owner of the copy and the related first-sale doctrine, and statutory exceptions to
copyright-in particular, fair use.
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always enjoyed "room to move," thanks to exceptions such as fair use
and rights stemming from ownership of a physical copy of the
41
protected work.
Entering the private sphere also means that copyright has to
fight a new, formidable opponent: the right to privacy, which is
anchored, among other places, in Article 8 of the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 42 and
in Articles 17 and 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, of December 16, 1966. 43 The right to make private
use of copyrighted material is considered fundamental in several
European copyright statutes, 44 and may have a constitutional basis in
a number of other legal systems. 45 The fight over the right to privacy
may be episodic or systematic, with the means of content distribution
chosen by rights holders as the principal determinant. If privacyinvasive tools are used to monitor the actions of end-users, 46 privacy
will become a major issue. If, however, systems are in place to
decouple usage data from individual identities early on, then the issue
may vanish from major policy radars.
Rights holders really only need to know what content is used,
47
and how much, in order to distribute monies collected for mass uses.
41.
See, e.g., Doan v. American Book Co., 105 F. 772, 777 (7th Cir. 1901) ("A right of
ownership in the book carries with it and includes the right to maintain the book as nearly
as possible in its original condition, so far, at least, as the cover and the binding of the book
is concerned." (citing Harrison v. Maynard, Merrill & Co., 61 F. 689 (2d Cir. 1894)).
42.
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, §
I, art. 8,opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, C.E.T.S. Doc. No. 005, amended by Protocol No.
11, opened for signature May 11, 1994, C.E.T.S. Doc. No. 155, available at
http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treaties/Html/005.htm.
43.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Part III, arts. 17, 19,
opened for signature Dec.
16,
1966, 999
U.N.T.S.
171,
available at
http://www.unhchr.chfhtml/menu3lb/a-ccpr.htm.
44.
See Lucie M. C. R. Guibault, Contracts and Copyright Exemptions, in
COPYRIGHT AND ELECTRONIC COMMERCE: LEGAL ASPECTS OF ELECTRONIC COPYRIGHT
MANAGEMENT 125 (P. Hugenholtz ed., 2000).

45.
For a description of the constitutional basis in the United States, see Julie E.
Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at "Copyright Management" in
Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981 (1996); see also Julie E. Cohen, DRM & Privacy, 18
BERKELEY TECH L.J. 575, 576-77 (2003) ("Properly understood, an individual's interest in
intellectual privacy has both spatial and informational aspects. At its core, this interest
concerns the extent of breathing space, both metaphorical and physical, available for
intellectual activity. [Digital rights management] technologies may threaten breathing
space by collecting information about intellectual consumption (and therefore exploration)
or by imposing direct constrains on these activities.").
46.
See Nicola Lucchi, Countering the Unfair Play of DRM Technologies, 16 TEX.
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 91, 94-102 (2007).
47.
As a concrete example, if a client is monitoring which songs are transferred
between users online (in a hypothetical licensed "sharing' model), then collectives or
equivalent entities administering the funds would need to know how often each song is
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Presumably they do not need to know precisely who is listening to
what. Performing rights organizations 48 need to know not just which
song was used and how many times, but also by whom and when,
because they might attribute higher value to a prime-time use by a
major user than a 4:00 a.m. use by a minor user. 49 By contrast, use by
millions of individual people should have a standard value and,
therefore, usage data linked to individuals would be unnecessary.
Consequently, privacy-compliant systems are possible, though
marketing data may be a different issue. While capturing only
aggregated demographic data on users for marketing purposes is a
viable option, the move from micro- to "nano-marketing" targeted to
individual preferences is likely to grow and pose privacy challenges
that will not be copyright-specific. 50
An additional problem related to the shift to individual users is
that, while copyright professionals tend to follow copyright rules as a
business decision and as a matter of basic risk assessment, individual
end-users must internalize the norm.
Otherwise, huge, and
51
sometimes futile, enforcement efforts are required.
Owing to this perceived inadequacy of copyright licensing,
normative concerns about privacy, and ownership of copies, social
norms have emerged by which some uses or reuses of digital content
are acceptable. These norms, often ostensibly fueled by the confusion
over fair use, have not responded well to traditional prohibitions
against reproduction, preparation of derivative works, and
communicating or publicly performing protected content. In fact,
combined with ineffective enforcement, 52 copyright has barely made a
dent in the massive reuse of protected content. 53 The rather vague

transferred, not by whom. Privacy of users is a key consideration. See Laurence Helfer,
Collective management of Copyright and Human Rights, in DANIEL GERVAIS, COLLECTIVE
MANAGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS 73 (2005). Demographic or geographic

data could likely be captured for marketing purposes.
48.
A "performing rights society" is an association, corporation, or other entity that

licenses the public performance of nondramatic musical works on behalf of copyright
owners of such works, such as the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers
(ASCAP), Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI), and SESAC, Inc. 17 U.S.C. §101 (2000).
49.
See MIHALY FICSOR, COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT AND RELATED
RIGHTS 44-48 (World Intellectual Property Organization 2002).

50.
The term "nano-marketing" has emerged in this context to reference marketing
efforts directed at a very small, targeted audience. See The Mattis Group,
http://www.mattisgroup.com/how.htm (last visited Apr. 30, 2009).
51.
See McBride & Smith, supra note 24.
52.
When measured in terms of overall decrease in unauthorized use, enforcement
has been ineffective.
53.
See Brett Lunceford & Shane Lunceford, Meh, The Irrelevance of Copyright in
the Public Mind, 7 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 33, 33 (2008).
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notions of fair use, and of de minimis use, 54 arguably support these
social norms, buttressed by the perceived social value in letting users
create freely and making content more available. 55 Whether those
norms and practices can be imbued with legal status and affect how
courts apply copyright to UGC remains unclear. 56 Still, there is
undeniably a meme, with a strong built-in feedback loop, that many
forms of UGC are "acceptable" within undefined parameters. This
may explain model codes and similar efforts to define those
57
parameters and "tweak the meme."

54.
The lack of enforcement is a key consideration. In patent law, it has been
argued that, while most forms of experimental use are illegal, see Madey v. Duke Univ.,
307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002), it is nonetheless routinely practiced because the cost
of enforcement is high and the damages typically low, see Intellectual Property:American
Exceptionalism or InternationalHarmonization?,3 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 448, 464 (2008).
One can analogize it to efficient breach. Whether the same argument can be made in the
field of copyright, with high statutory damages- $150,000 for wilful infringement, see 17
U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2000). An interesting view of the conflict between those damages and
the status of individual end-user was expressed by Chief Judge Davis who, in granting the
motion for a new trial presented by a Minnesota woman ordered to pay $220,000 in
damages for file-sharing, wrote:
All of the cited cases involve corporate or business defendants and seek to deter
future illegal commercial conduct. The parties point to no case in which large
statutory damages were applied to a party who did not infringe in search of
commercial gain ... Part of the justification for large statutory damages awards
in copyright cases is to deter actors by ensuring that the possible penalty for
infringing substantially outweighs the potential gain from infringing. In the case
of commercial actors, the potential gain in revenues is enormous and enticing to
potential infringers. In the case of individuals who infringe by using
peer - to - peer networks, the potential gain from infringement is access to free
music, not the possibility of hundreds of thousands-or even millions--of dollars
in profits. This fact means that statutory damages awards of hundreds of
thousands of dollars is certainly far greater than necessary to accomplish
Congress's goal of deterrence. Her status as a consumer who was not seeking to
harm her competitors or make a profit does not excuse her behavior. But it does
make the award of hundreds of thousands of dollars in damages unprecedented
and oppressive.
Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1227-28 (D.Minn. 2008). More
controversial was his finding that "by using Kazaa, Thomas acted like countless other
Internet users. Her alleged acts were illegal, but common." Id. at 1227. Whether that can
stand as a defense is a most interesting question, but one I will have to leave aside for now.
See Julie E. Cohen, WIPO Copyright Treaty Implementation in the United
55.
States: Will Fair Use Survive?, 21 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 236, 244-45 (1999); Peter Jaszi,
Copyright, Fair Use And Motion Pictures, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 715, 729 (2007). Who would
have been able to say with any certainty that making available thumbnail pictures was fair
use? See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007).
See Edward Lee, Warming Up to User Generated Content, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV.
56.
1459, 1466-68.
57.
For two different efforts on that front, compare Fair Use Principles for User
Generated Video Content, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, http://www.eff.org
with User Generated Content
/issues/ip-and-free-speech/fair-use-principles-usergen,
Principles, http://www.ugcprinciples.com (last visited Apr. 2, 2009) (listing the principles
made available by leading commercial copyright owners).

20091

TANGLED WEB OF UGC

Again, copyright's ineffectual response to the social norms that
underpin UGC has multiple factors: application of a regulatory system
not designed for mass consumptive use rather than mass reuse;
inability or unwillingness to license both types of use because of either
the type of use or the type of user; normative battles regarding the
rights of end-users;58 and a marked lack of understanding, at least
until very recently, of network effects and the use of the Internet to
create virtual groups of friends who want to "share" the pictures,
shows, books, or music they like but in most cases have not
59
authored.
This poses the question: how far does the private sphere
extend? Does it explode when a digital use inside it is made available
to others online? The social norms at play do not seem to reflect the
traditional distinction between private (i.e., tolerated) and public (i.e.,
unauthorized) use. These norms have existed for decades and are
reflected in the traditional views expressed by large rights holders.
For example, the Recording Industry Association of America condones
limited copying for private use, but does not approve of making
copyrighted content available online. 60 Technologically, however, the
same copy that is legal to make for personal use becomes illegal if
made available to others, again according to the traditional view. 61 On
a technical level, making it available online would then be an
infringement under one of several possible theories across various
national legal systems: in Canada, it could be considered the
authorization of communication to the public, 62 and in the United
States it could be deemed an inducement to download and therefore
copy without authorization, or to publicly perform. 63 Put differently,
58.
See Jeremy Stanley Managing Digital Rights Management: Effectively
ProtectingIntellectual Property And Consumer Rights In The Wake Of The Sony CD Copy
ProtectionScandal, J. L. & POLY FOR INFO. SOC'Y 157, 168-75 (2008).

59.
See Daniel J. Gervais, The Price of Social Norms: Towards a Liability Regime
for File-Sharing,12 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 39, 40-43 (2004).
60.
See RIAA - Piracy: Online and On the Street, http://www.riaa.com
/physicalpiracy.php?content selector=piracy-online-thejlaw (last visited Apr. 2, 2009)
("[B]urning a copy of CD onto a CD-R, or transferring a copy onto your computer hard drive
or your portable music player, won't usually raise concerns so long as:
*
The copy is made from an authorized original CD that you legitimately own
*
The copy is just for your personal use.")
61.
See id.
62.
See Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Music Publishers of Can. v. Can. Ass'n of
Internet Providers, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 427 (Can.); Daniel J. Gervais, The Purpose of Copyright
Law in Canada,2:2 U.O.L.T.J. 315, 323-25 (2006).
63.
See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 919
(2005); Bennett Lincoff, Common Sense, Accommodation and Sound Policy for the Digital
Music Marketplace, 2 J. INT'L MEDIA & ENT. L. 1, 8 (2008) ("Prior to the Internet, the
reproduction and distribution rights, on the one hand, and the public performance right, on
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the disconnect between social and legal norms lies in the blurring of
the private/public distinction.
We can conclude from this analysis that traditionally there
were two distinctions: one between private and public use, and
another between professional and amateur use. The technological
environment until approximately the year 2000 meant that the two
different distinctions overlapped; amateur meant private and
professional meant public.
The shift from one-to-many to many-to-many dissemination
modes destabilized this system, and amateur no longer meant private.
Normatively, the question is this: should amateur use prevail over
public use when the two realms are separated? Some-most famously
Professor Lawrence Lessig-have argued for an amateur "exemption"
to allow remix. 64 Several normative arguments have been made to
support this view, as well as some pragmatic arguments, such as the
difficulty in licensing amateur uses. 65 If, however, the amateur leaves
her private sphere,6 6 then normatively the issue is no longer the
confrontation between privacy and copyright, but one of amateur
versus professional. While historically professional use was the sole
focus of copyright law, if practical considerations rather than
normative ones drove the absence of the amateur creator, then those
amateurs should probably learn to use exemptions such as fair use or
safe harbors. Then again, a valid case can be made that copyright
need not consider
"small" everyday uses, and instead should focus on
"superusers."6 7 As a practical matter, this rings true if the goal is to
transactionally license single uses, although blanket licenses for some
uses may also be used. This Article will return to considering fair use

the other, were separate and distinct, exploited in different ways, and subject to different
business models and licensing regimes. Digital technology generally, and the Internet in
particular, has rendered unenforceable certain of these pre-existing rights and blurred the
distinctions between others. Through the Internet, the means of reproduction, distribution
and public performance of songs and of the recordings that embody them have been merged
into a single act of digital transmission that can be initiated and completed on a massive
scale in a matter of moments at practically no cost by anyone and everyone in the world
with network access. The industry's strategy to salvage the sales-based revenue model
proceeded in opposition to these changed circumstances which it never could have
overcome.").
64.
See LESSIG, supra note 2.
65.
I will not develop this idea here but many forms of repertory or blanket licenses
are possible. See Gervais, supra note 27.
66.
Deciding in which cases this happens would require a different article, and the
answer is likely to be different in each legal system.
67.
See Paul Ohm, The Myth of the Superuser: Fear, Risk, and Harm Online, 41
U.C. DAvis L. REV. 1327, 1398-99 (2008).
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in the context of this issue after a brief attempt at a taxonomy of UGC
in the next Part.
II. A COPYRIGHT-RELATED TAXONOMY OF
USER-GENERATED CONTENT
A. Proposed Taxonomy
There have been some efforts to categorize UGC. For example,
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's
(OECD) report on user-created content (UCC) 68 distinguished UCC
along two axes: 69 first, based on the type of content (text, novel, or
poetry; photos, images, music, and audio; video; educational content;
mobile content; or virtual content); and second, according to its
distribution platform (blogs, text-based collaboration formats, sites
allowing feedback on written works, group-based aggregation,
podcasting, social network sites, virtual worlds, or content or filesharing sites). 70 This effort is certainly a useful one, guiding us to
draw certain distinctions, but it is unsatisfactory from a copyright
perspective for a number of reasons. First of all, the distinctions
between type and platform are not crystalline (for example, "virtual
worlds" is used in both), and second, copyright has tried to be
technologically neutral 71 and has not drawn distinctions between
categories of content. 72 It is true, however, that some distinctions
between types of use and types of users induce normative distinctions
68.
content.
69.

While the OECD uses this term, is may be deemed a synonym of user-generated

ORGANISATION
FOR
ECONOMIC
COOPERATION
AND
DEVELOPMENT,
PARTICIPATIVE WEB AND USER-CREATED CONTENT, 34-38 (Apr. 12, 2007), available at

http://213.253.134.43/oecd/pdfs/browseit/9307031E.PDF [hereinafter OECD Report]. UCC
is an unfortunate acronym for readers in the United States, who are more accustomed to
associating it with the Uniform Commercial Code. See U.C.C. (2003).
70.
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note
69, at 15-16.

71.
See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 105-551, pt.2, at 25 (1998) ("[T]he digital environment
poses a unique threat to the rights of copyright owners, and as such, necessitates
protection against devices that undermine copyright interests. In contrast to the analog
experience, digital technology enables pirates to reproduce and distribute perfect copies of
works-at virtually no cost at all to the pirate. As technology advances, so must our laws.
The Committee thus seeks to protect the interests of copyright owners in the digital
environment, while ensuring that copyright law remain technology neutral.").
72.
Apart from the limited performance right in sound recordings (which, in any
event, are not copyrighted works in legal systems outside the United States, but rather
objects of a "neighboring" or related right), § 106 rights apply to all categories of works.
See, e.g., George H.C. Bodenhausen, Protection of "Neighboring Rights," 19 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 156 (1954).
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about possible exceptions. Educational users, for example, may stake
a public interest claim to free, spontaneous use of classroom
73
material.
To understand the application of copyright, I suggest that we
should recognize only three categories of user-generated content: userauthored content, user-derived content, and user-copied content. The
first two may be grouped under the umbrella concept of "user-created
content," although I find this notion mostly unhelpful for the purposes
of this analysis.
1. User-Authored Content
Theoretically, this type of content is an easy question. It
involves neither copying nor derivation nor adaptation. The author is
free to copy, upload, perform, and/or make available her content on
any basis, including allowing free and unrestricted use, imposing
conditions for free use such as those found in Creative Commons
licenses, 74 or licensing the content commercially.
One issue that may surface, however, is the interaction
between the contracts employed by users of UGC-empowering sites
and technologies, including social networking sites, which in some
75
cases convey a license to the operator of the site.
2. User-Derived Content
This second category of UGC is by far the most complicated in
terms of copyright, because a satisfactory inquiry would require a

73.
See AGREEMENT ON GUIDELINES FOR CLASSROOM COPYING IN NOT-FOR-PROFIT
EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS WITH RESPECT TO BOOKS AND PERIODICALS, H.R. REP. No. 94-

1476, at 68 (1976).
See Licenses - Creative Commons, http://creativecommons.org/about/licenses
74.
(last visited Apr. 2, 2009).
See, e.g., Christina J. Hayes, Note, Changing the Rules of the Game: How Video
75.
Game PublishersAre Embracing User-Generated Derivative Works, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
567, 569 (2008). Most websites require users to agree to a set of terms and conditions in
which the user agrees to grant a license to the website owner to use the material the user
posts. See Charles J. Biederman & Danny Andrews, Applying Copyright Law To UserGenerated Content, L.A. LAW., May 2008, at 14 ('Many sites that utilize UGC include
language in their terms and conditions and EULAs requiring users to warrant that their
submitted content does not infringe on any third party's intellectual property rights. These
sites generally allow users to retain ownership of the content they create (to the extent that
the content is noninfringing and otherwise permissible by law); require users to grant the
ISP and its users very broad licenses to reproduce, transmit, or otherwise use the content;
and provide dispute resolution procedures, which often include mandatory arbitration and
other provisions required by the [Digital Millennium Copyright Act].").
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However, if the
normative analysis of the underlying right. 76
derivation and possibly also the reproduction of the preexisting
content is a fair use, then the matter is of less importance. This
Article considers the application of the fair use doctrine in Part III.
3. User-Copied Content
The third category is not inordinately complicated. Copying is
prima facie infringement, and this type of copying, where the user
merely copies preexisting content, is thus generally illegal and
illegitimate, though some might argue that it is understandable from
the point of view of "gregarious" users.7 7 Uploading a song, picture, or
film will be infringement unless it is a fair use. However, a few
questions do emerge.
First, the ratio issue might become relevant if only a short
78
excerpt is used-this issue is not limited to the online environment.

76.
A task I will undertake in a different paper.
77.
This could be discussed on many levels. At a philosophical level, imitation is a
way of belonging. For a Rawlsian analysis, see Speranta Dumitru, Are Rawlsians Entitled
to Monopoly Rights, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THEORIES OF JUSTICE 57, 61 (Axel
Grosseries et al. eds., 2008) ("A 'companion effect', Rawls maintains, of the Aristotelian
principle [according to which, all things being equal, human beings enjoy the exercise of
their innate and trained abilities] is the general tendency to appreciate, learn and imitate
products of human excellence: 'as we witness the exercise of well-trained abilities by others,
these displays are enjoyed by us and arouse a desire to do the same things ourselves'.").
Recoding is also a form of discourse. See David M. Morrison, Bridgeport Redux: Digital
Sampling And Audience Recoding, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 75, 79
("[Riecoding [may be defined] as 'using the cultural object or recognizable elements of the
object in a forum for third persons to achieve different effects than those generally achieved
already by the object; the different results must affect the meaning of the original object in
the social discourse."').
78.
The ratio is the amount used measured against the totality of the work from
which it is taken. This may be de minimis (see supra notes 35 and 54 and accompanying
text). However, the analysis is not limited to quantitative elements. See, e.g., Harper &
Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 548-49 (1985) (holding that "generous
verbatim excerpts" of a particularly quantitatively important part of a book did not
constitute a fair use). The circumstances under which the copy of the book was secured
may have influenced the outcome.; see also Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley
Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 613 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding that "copying the entirety of a work is
sometimes necessary to make a fair use"); Nihon Keizai Shimbum, Inc. v. Comline Bus.
Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65, 71 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that copying a paragraph of a news story
was not infringing); Publ'ns Int'l, Ltd. v. Meredith Corp., 88 F.3d 473, 480-81 (7th Cir.
1996) (holding that copying a recipe out of a collection of recipes was not infringing);
Alberto-Culver Co. v. Andrea Dumon, Inc., 466 F.2d 705, 710 n.2 (7th Cir. 1972) (holding
that copying a paragraph from a label on a bottle of deodorant was not infringing). The
ratio is applied much more on a qualitative than a quantitative basis, and its application is
informed by the circumstances and purpose of the excerpt used. See Barton Beebe, An
Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978-2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549,
615 (2008).
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That said, many works uploaded or made available online are integral
copies of preexisting works. Secondly, what will be the scope of the
"Google defense" (that making content available in a different form is
fair use) going forward? 79 This Article discusses the case from which
this defense arose in Part III.
4. Peer-to-Peer as UGC
While unauthorized peer-to-peer (P2P) file-sharing is generally
it has been abundantly clear for years that it must eventually
be monetized in order for the industry to equal in the online market
the revenue it made selling physical copies.81 I do not make a
normative claim here; I make two empirical ones. First, if the recent
past is a prologue, P2P cannot be stopped; second, the music industry
loses money hand over fist in any scenario in which they try to stop
P2P.82 Put differently, even if P2P is ever brought down to a lower
level, it will not significantly increase industry revenue, and it will
raise broader public interest concerns if right holders force millions of
people off of the web by shutting down Internet accounts, university
83
servers, and other networks.
Controlled monetizing is also the best possible outcome for
composers, artists, producers, and the users who want to keep the
music coming. A subscription service that anonymously tracks usage
and allows legal users of that service to "share" music seems like an
optimal outcome at this stage.8 4
illegal,8 0

See infra note 87 and accompanying text.
79.
It typically requires a reproduction on the server from which the copy is made
80.
and a copy on the computer on which it is received. The transmission itself may be a
separate instance of infringement. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster,
Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 919 (2005).
For a review of various P2P monetization proposals, see Salil K. Mehra, The
81.
iPod Tax: Why the Digital Copyright System of American Law Professors'DreamsFailed in
Japan,79 U. COLO. L. REV. 421 (2008).
See, e.g., Antionette D. Bishop, Illegal P2PFile Sharing on College Campuses 82.
What's The Solution?, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 515, 520 (2008); Adam Liptak, In the
Heated Fight Over Music Piracy, a Rare Stand for Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2007, at
All.
Anonymous tracking was proposed in France for "repeat peer-to-peer offenders."
83.
See Jacqui Cheng, "Three strikes" P2P rule inches closer to law in France,ARS TECHNICA,
Nov. 2, 2008, available at http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20081102-three-strikes-p2prule-inches-closer-to-law-in-france.html.
See Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at "Copyright
84.
Management" in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981, 981-83, 987 (1996).
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III. FAIR USE AND UGC
In any discussion of the fair use doctrine, especially one
regarding the online environment, the tangled nature of web copyright
becomes even more complicated, in part because of First Amendment
issues.8 5 That said, using the taxonomy proposed in Part II, some
distinctions and conclusions may be easier to draw than others.
A. User-Copied Content
If the production of user-copied content is a fair use in a given
fact pattern, it will be for reasons other than those applicable to userauthored or user-derived content. The production of such content will
be a fair use if the user's act of providing access to it is fair use, which
would typically rest on First Amendment grounds. Full analysis of
how the First Amendment might be used as a defense to a copyright
infringement claim is beyond the scope of this Article. However, as
Professor Netanel has noted, "[First Amendment] challenges to
copyright law 'as applied' would likely focus on whether the regulation
leaves open 'ample alternative channels' for communication of the
'8 6
burdened speech.
This doctrine may have been extended by the "Google
defense."8 7
Reversing in part a decision finding that making
thumbnail versions of magazine Perfect 1W's "adult" images was not a
fair use because it could hamper the market for such thumbnails,8 8 the
Ninth Circuit held that the thumbnails were a fair use.8 9 Referencing
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 90 the court noted that the first fair use factor 9'
required a court to consider
the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes. The central purpose of
this inquiry is to determine whether and to what extent the new work is

85.
See Paul Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REV.
983 (1970); Neil W. Netanel, Locating Copyright within the First Amendment Skein, 54
STAN. L. REV. 1 (2001).
86.
Netanel, supra note 85, at 35 (discussing the test enunciated in Turner Broad.
Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 185 (1997)).
87.
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828, 836 (C.D. Cal. 2006).
88.
Id. at 851. The original decision ignored the additional steps required to get the
thumbnail image to a cellphone. See Britton Payne, Comment, Imperfect 10: Digital
Advances and Market Impact in Fair Use Analysis, 17 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 279, 289-90 (2006).
89.
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 725 (9th Cir. 2007), amended on
rehearing by 508 F.3d 1146, 1168 (9th Cir. 2007).
90.
510 U.S. 569 (1994).
91.
See 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2000).
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'transformative.' A work is 'transformative' when the new work does not 'merely
supersede the objects of the original creation' but rather 'adds something new, with
a further purpose or 92different character, altering the first with new expression,
meaning, or message.

This analysis seems correct, but may have been applied to the wrong
fact pattern. 93 In Campbell, the allegedly infringing work, a hip-hop
version of Roy Orbison's "Pretty Woman," was created content,
whereas the Perfect 10 court applied it to a new form of
dissemination. 94 In other words, the court ignored the traditional
difference between work-centered rights and dissemination-centered
rights. Before that case, transformativeness focused on changes to the
work, including a creative recontextualization, but not a mere
modification in its mode of dissemination.
Put differently,
recontextualization
(e.g. by Jeff Koonz 95 ) must involve a
transformation (alteration) of the work itself, not to the mode of
access. 96
Recontextualization involved creativity and one could
hypothesize that transformativeness properly conceived requires
Feistian originality, that is a modicum of (human-generated)
creativity. 97
The automated grouping and/or reformatting of
preexisting works copied by a search engine in response to a user
search hardly fit this criterion. Ironically, the Ninth Circuit quoted its
own Wall Data opinion which seems to support that distinction: 98 "A
use is considered transformative only where a defendant changes a
plaintiffs copyrighted work or uses the plaintiffs copyrighted work in

92.
Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d at 1164.
93.
Paul Goldstein quipped that the decision was "a triumph of mindless sound bite
over principled analysis," and added that "[p]arody is a fair use category; the mere
transport of a work intact from one medium to another-without abridgment or other
modification-is not. Is there any doubt that, faced with facts like these, Justice Story-or
Justice Souter-would have placed them on the infringement side of the line? What
principle has changed in the 167 years since Folsom to make a relevant difference?" Paul
Goldstein, Fair Use in Context, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 433, 442 (2008).
94.
Compare Campbell, 510 U.S. at 571-94, with Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 416
F. Supp. 2d 828, 831-51 (C.D. Cal. 2006).
95.
See Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006). See also Bill Graham
Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006).
96.
In Castle Rock Entertainment v. Carol Publishing Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132 (2d
Cir. 1998), a case involving the creation of a test on well-known television series, found the
copying non-transformative use, noting that the defendant had only "minimally alter[ed]"
the Plaintiffs content.
97.
See Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Service Company, Inc., 499 U.S. 340
(1991). For a comment suggesting that the test of a modicum of creativity is well-grounded
normatively (independently of its ostensible constitutional origin in the case), see Daniel
Gervais, Feist Goes Global: A Comparative Analysis of the Notion of Originality in
Copyright Law, 49 J. COPYRIGHT Soc. OF THE USA 949, 973-980 (2002).
98.
Wall Data, Inc. v. L.A. County Sheriffs Dept., 447 F.3d 769, 778 (9th Cir. 2006).
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a different context such that the plaintiffs work is transformed into a
new creation." 99
Transformativeness was historically and normatively linked to
expression, not re-dissemination.10 0
As mentioned
above,
dissemination may also be fair use, but on other grounds.1 0 ' One may
argue that there are public policy imperatives that would allow
thumbnail access and, more generally, favor broad access to material
on search engines such as Google. 10 2 It is unclear, however, that
transformativeness is the appropriate vehicle to carry those concerns
forward.

99.
Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d at 1165 (quoting Wall Data, 447 F.3d at 778).
100.
Its source in U.S. copyright law may be Pierre Leval's 1990 article, Toward a
Fair Use Standard, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1105 (1990), in which he wrote:
[T]he purpose and character of the use"' raises the question of justification. Does
the use fulfill the objective of copyright law to stimulate creativity for public
illumination? This question is vitally important to the fair use inquiry, and lies
at the heart of the fair user's case. Recent judicial opinions have not sufficiently
recognized its importance.
In analyzing a fair use defense, it is not sufficient simply to conclude whether or
not justification exists. The question remains how powerful, or persuasive, is the
justification, because the court must weigh the strength of the secondary user's
justification against factors favoring the copyright owner.
I believe the answer to the question of justification turns primarily on whether,
and to what extent, the challenged use is transformative. The use must be
productive and must employ the quoted matter in a different manner or for a
different purpose from the original. A quotation of copyrighted material that
merely repackages or republishes the original is unlikely to pass the test; in
Justice Story's words, it would merely "supersede the objects"' of the original. If,
on the other hand, the secondary use adds value to the original-if the quoted
matter is used as raw material, transformed in the creation of new information,
new aesthetics, new insights and understandings-this is the very type of
activity that the fair use doctrine intends to protect for the enrichment of society.
Transformative uses may include criticizing the quoted work, exposing the
character of the original author, proving a fact, or summarizing an idea argued
in the original in order to defend or rebut it. They also may include parody,
symbolism, aesthetic declarations, and innumerable other uses.
Id. at 1111 (notes omitted and emphasis added).
101.
See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
102.
This concern was central in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's
previous decision in Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 816, 819 (9th Cir. 2003)
("Arriba's use of the images serve[d] a different function than Kelly's use-improving
access to information on the internet versus artistic expression."). It was cited with
approval by the court in Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d at 1165, which added that "search
engine provides social benefit by incorporating an original work into a new work, namely,
an electronic reference tool. Indeed, a search engine may be more transformative than a
parody because a search engine provides an entirely new use for the original work, while a
parody typically has the same entertainment purpose as the original work. . . . [E]ven
making an exact copy of a work may be transformative so long as the copy serves a
different function than the original work." Id.
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One may counter, naturally, that no such distinction is made in
the copyright statute. 10 3 Yet historical analysis shows that the 1976
Act should be read as a significant departure from the principles
concerning derivative works and fair use in the case law concerning
the 1909 Act. 10 4 The conclusion reached in Perfect 10 may be correct
on the basis of a "fresh" reading of the text of § 107 because it focused
on the first factor of fair use, purpose, and the fourth factor, effect on
the market-the two most important factors. 10 5 Whether or not that is
the case, the court should not have relied on transformativeness. Now
we must now distinguish transformative dissemination from
10 6
transformative creation, which is hard to reconcile with Campbell.
Professor Anthony Reese's analysis of relevant fair use cases
since Campbell makes a critical point: 10 7 the inquiry into whether the
use of a work may be transformative from a teleological perspective is
1 08
distinct from the question of whether copyright was infringed.
Theoretically, a "transformative use" may infringe the reproduction
right, the right to make derivative works, or both. The fair use
defense could successfully apply to both rights. Yet, not all derivative
works are transformative, and some transformative uses do not
involve the creation of a derivative work. 10 9 In fact, one court found
that these were exclusive categories. 10

103.
See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
104.
This is not what Congress intended apparently. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994).
105.
See P. Leval, supra note 100.
See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578-79: "The enquiry into the purpose and character
106.
of the use "asks ... whether and to what extent the new work is 'transformative.'Although
such transformative use is not absolutely necessary for a finding of fair use, the goal of
copyright, to promote science and the arts, is generally furthered by the creation of
transformativeworks." (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
R. Anthony Reese, Transformativeness and the Derivative Work Right, 31
107.
COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 467, 494 (2008).
108.
Id. at 494 ("[A]ppellate courts also clearly do not view the preparation of a
derivative work-or any transformation or alteration of a work's content-as necessary to a
finding that a defendant's use is transformative. Instead, courts focus on whether the
purpose of the defendant's use is transformative.").
For example, in Warner Bros. Entm't Inc. v. RDR Books (perhaps better known
109.
as the Harry PotterLexicon case), the court held that the lexicon was not a derivative work
before continuing on to decide the issue of transformativeness for the purpose of its fair use
analysis. 575 F. Supp. 2d 513, 538-39 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
See Castle Rock Entm't, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 143 (2d
110.
Cir. 1998) ("Although derivative works that are subject to the author's copyright transform
an original work into a new mode of presentation, such works-unlike works of fair usetake expression for purposes that are not 'transformative."').
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It is possible to draw a distinction between the application of
Google's defense1 11 in Perfect 10 to an alleged violation of the right of
reproduction and its application to the right to prepare derivative
works. Preparing derivatives is not necessarily copying. However, it
is doubtful that Google's automated generation of search results and
inline linking and framing functions1 2 constitutes a derivative work,
13
especially when looked at through a Feistian lens.
B. User-Authored Content
A fair use defense should not be required, because where no
previous copyrighted content is reused, there should be no finding of
infringement.
C. User-Derived Content
The harder fair use question is that of user-derived content.
Courts do not always make a clear distinction between infringement of
the right to make copies and the right to prepare derivative works
when applying fair use.11 4 In Campbell, however, the Supreme Court
did consider the effect on the market for "derivative uses" and focused
11 5
on normal licensing transactions.
While it may be difficult, and probably not desirable, to eschew
equitable considerations entirely, I suggest that the purpose of the
111.
So called here because it is the making available of content in a different form
through a search engine that the court considered transformative. If this type of
"transformation" is indeed a fair use, then presumably it would apply to many categories of
content that Google users may locate on the Internet using search engines such as Google's.
112.
See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1160 (9th Cir. 2007)
(explaining that "Google does not, however, display a copy of full-size infringing
photographic images for purposes of the Copyright Act when Google frames in-line linked
images that appear on a user's computer screen"); see also Lee Burgunder & Barry Floyd,
The Future Of Inline Web Designing After Perfect 10, 17 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 2-3
(2008).
113.
See Feist Publ'ns v. Rural Tel. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345-47 (1991). The Feist Court
noted that originality emerged from a modicum of creativity in the form of choices made by
the author that were not dictated by function or standards. Id. at 346-47. Where are the
creative choices that generate the required originality here? See Daniel J. Gervais, Feist
Goes Global:A ComparativeAnalysis of the Notion of Originalityin Copyright Law, 49 J.
COPYRIGHT. Soc.Y USA 949, 952-53, 975-81 (2002).
114.
For a case where the court seemed to analyze the two separately, see Lewis
Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 969 (9th Cir. 1992).
115.
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 592 (1994) ("The market for
potential derivative uses includes only those that creators of original works would in
general develop or license others to develop. Yet the unlikelihood that creators of
imaginative works will license critical reviews or lampoons of their own productions
removes such uses from the very notion of a potential licensing market.").
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right to prepare derivative works was to protect markets that an
author may wish to exploit herself. The analysis is not subjective; it
focuses on whether the market in question is normal for the type of
work concerned. 116 The analysis should also reflect the nature and
extent of what was taken from the first work. A parody is noninfringing because it does not cater to a market that the author should
1 17
want to exploit and from which should be allowed to exclude others.
As noted in Part I, noncommercial individual reuses are rarely
licensed, even less so through collective systems.1 18 The typical
transaction would likely involve small amounts of money, and thus
transaction costs would be a dominant consideration. Two different
avenues are possible. First, automated systems may be a practicable
solution, even though the cost of developing them is not
inconsequential' 19-or second, repertory-based licenses. 120
Should
either solution emerge as an available option, then the normalcy of
that form of exploitation might trigger the application of the threestep test 121 and impact the analysis of the fourth fair use factor. 122

116.
See Daniel J. Gervais, Towards A New Core InternationalCopyright Norm: The
Reverse Three-Step Test, 9 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 1-37(2005) [hereinafter Gervais,
Towards A New Core InternationalCopyrightNorm].
117.
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 593 ("[T]he only harm to derivatives that need concern us
...is the harm of market substitution. The fact that a parody may impair the market for
derivative uses by the very effectiveness of its critical commentary is no more relevant
under copyright than the like threat to the original market."); see also Suntrust Bank v.
Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1274-76 (11th Cir. 2001).
118.
See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
119.
For an analysis of technology and filters in particular, see Brette G. Meyers,
Note, Filtering Systems or Fair Use? A Comparative Analysis of Proposed Regulations For
User-GeneratedContent, 26 CARDoZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 935 (2009).
120.
Repertory-based licenses are sometimes referred to as "blanket licenses," unless
the system is supported by a compulsory license. The term seems incorrect unless one
accepts that the blanket has only partial coverage. See Salil K. Mehra, The Ipod Tax: Why
the Digital Copyright System of American Law Professors' Dreams Failed in Japan, 79 U.
Colo. L. Rev. 421, 424 n.9 (2008). Any voluntary system based on contractual transfer to a
central entity of the authority to license will be incomplete because not all rights holders
will join, especially if a worldwide view is taken. A possible compromise, however, is the
application by law of an extended repertoire system. See Daniel J. Gervais, The Changing
Role of Copyright Collectives, supra note 27, at 28-34. Under such a system, once a
substantial number of rights holders have voluntarily joined a collective system, the law
may extent to the collective entity the authority to license on behalf of all other rights
holders worldwide, except those who opt out. See id.
121.
The three-step test is contained in Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement-the
WTO Agreement on trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights-and acts as a
filter to determine the compatibility of exceptions and limitations contained in national
copyright laws. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Apr. 15, 1994, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994). Section 110(5)(b) of the
U.S. Copyright Act was found inconsistent with the test in 2000 by a World Trade
Organization dispute-settlement panel. See D. GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT:
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The availability of a technological licensing solution should not,
in itself, be sufficient evidence that a market exists. It is a sign that a
market is possible. Contrary to Texaco, a case in which the Second
Circuit considered the existence of a viable licensing solution (namely
Copyright Clearance Center, Inc.) as a valid consideration in
determining market harm, no such system is in place and working and
thus the emergence of a technology-based solution should have a
123
smaller impact than it did in that case.
In the same way that a transformativeness analysis should be,
as suggested above, informed by the creation/dissemination
distinction, 124 the fair use analysis applied to online derived content
must include an adequate fairness test. A distinction must be made
between use value gained by the user and lost exchange value by the
right holder.1 25 The proper test is one of commercial exploitation and
seems to focus on the latter. Put in blunter terms: is the derivation
Parasitic behaviour imposes
parasitic or simply free-riding?1 26
DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 237-48 (3d ed. 2008); Gervais, Towards A New Core
InternationalCopyright Norm, supra note 116, at 1-37.
122.
See generally Paul Goldstein, Derivative Rights and Derivative Works in
Copyright, 30 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y USA 209, 216, 232-33 (1983); Wendy J. Gordon, Fair

Use as Market Failure:A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its
Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1614-1619 (1982); Frank Pasquale, Breaking the

Vicious Circularity: Sony's Contribution to the Fair Use Doctrine, 55 CASE WES. RES. L.
REV. 777, 783-84 (2005).

123.
See Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 929 (2d Cir. 1994)
("The District Court [...]
pointed out that, if Texaco's unauthorized photocopying was not
permitted as fair use, the publishers' revenues would increase significantly since Texaco
would (1) obtain articles from document delivery services (which pay royalties to publishers
for the right to photocopy articles), (2) negotiate photocopying licenses directly with
individual publishers, and/or (3) acquire some form of photocopying license from the
Copyright Clearance Center Inc. ("CCC")); See also Steven Hetcher, Orphan Works And
Google's Global Library Project, 8 WAKE FOREST INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 35 (2007) ("Just as

the CCC changed the factual situation vis-A-vis utility generation such that what was once
a fair use was no longer a fair use, due to the emergence of an entity that promised to
provide a better route to enhanced social welfare, so too for the shift in remedies promoted
in the Orphan Works Report. Google will argue that there is an important difference,
however, which is that in Texaco the CCC was already in place. By contrast, the Orphan
Works Report's proffered shift in remedies is a proposal, not a reality.").
124.
See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
125.
In a more "extreme" version of this argument, Posner noted (in a variation of
the theme of non-rivalry) that "[w]hile the theft of physical property deprives the property's
owner of its use, the 'theft' of intellectual property does not. Indeed, if the software pirate,
or those who purchase the pirated software from him, could not or would not pay the price
charged by the owner of the patented or copyrighted software (this assumes that the
owner's ability to price discriminate is limited, so that the owner cannot snag the poorest
customers by reducing the price to them to just a shade above the owner's marginal cost),
then piracy does not cost the owner any lost sales." Richard A. Posner, Intellectual
Property: The Law and Economics Approach, 19:2 J. ECON. PERSP. 57, 64 (2005).
126.

See generally DAVID GAUTHIER, MORALS BY AGREEMENT (1987).
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negative externalities on the right holder; a free rider merely benefits
If due to license cost levels and/or
from positive externalities.
transaction costs there are no demonstrable lost sales, user-derived
content would seem to fit in the latter category and a court should
consider this when deciding the fairness of the use. It fits within the
first and fourth criteria.
D. Enforcement Issues
If the scope and extent of an infringement is severe enough, it
may qualitatively affect the scope of the right. Interesting theoretical
analyses have been suggested in this context, such as legal scholar
Tim Wu's suggestion of "tolerated use":
Tolerated use is infringing usage of a copyrighted work of which the copyright
owner may be aware, yet does nothing about. There may be a variety of reasons
for tolerating use. Reasons can include simple laziness or enforcement costs, a
desire to create goodwill, or a calculation that the infringement creates an
economic complement to the copyrighted work-it actually benefits the
owner ....
What is the difference between tolerated use and implicitly licensed use? The
difference is legal. In the case of an implicit license you could, if brought to court,
point to some conduct or writing that creates permission to engage in the activity
in question. For example, many newspapers and magazines, such as the New York
Times, provide a way for readers to email articles. Such emailing constitutes both
a "reproduction" and a "distribution" of the articles under the copyright law.
However, someone sued for such emailing would have a defense: that by clearly
encouraging readers to email stories, the paper had implicitly created a contracta non-exclusive license-permitting the reader to email the stories to friends.
By contrast, in a tolerated use scenario, there is no such contract. Instead, the
defense, if any, is a fair use argument of some kind, an argument that the laches of
the copyright owner should bar recovery (equity aids the vigilant), or possibly a
statute of limitations defense. The main point is that that liability likely exists,
but it is simply a matter of non-enforcement. The difference from an implied
contact should be clear. 127

It may indeed be time to reconsider the scope of implied
Whether a court will acknowledge that a
licenses and laches.
customary practice has developed and give legal effect to such practice
is unclear. It would make sense, however, to consider implied consent
if the practice in question can be linked to the copyright holder or if it
can be shown that it is commonplace within its industry. Professor
Edward Lee has gone one step further in suggesting formal
consideration of informal copyright practices as "gap fillers" in the

127.
omitted).

Tim Wu, Tolerated Use, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 617, 619-20 (2008) (notes
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law.1 28 The difficulty inherent in any such approach is that the
Copyright Act provides for high statutory damages129-so high that at
least one court has expressed the view that they are disproportionate
for cases of infringement by individual Internet users.1 30 The presence
of an informal practice might lead a court to at least be lenient on the
willfulness criterion, which, when applicable, quintuples the
31
maximum award.1
IV.CONCLUSION

Copyright has entered the sphere of "users." Many of these
have harnessed the power of digital technology and online
dissemination to generate and make available copyrightable
content.132 When that content is authored entirely by the user, such
as a photograph taken by the user, then he need not worry about
copyright infringement claims. There are two other categories of
"user-generated content" that are much more problematic, however.
User-derived content uses preexisting content but adds to it
substantially, in some cases to the point of producing a derivative
work. In most cases, a substantial reproduction of one of more extant
works is also involved. User-derived content may thus infringe both
the reproduction right and the adaptation right; the user may
128.
See Edward Lee, Warming Up to User Generated Content, 2008 U. Ill. L. Rev.
1459, 1474-75 ("The primary reason we need gap fillers in copyright law is quite simple:
formal copyright law is riddled with gray areas and gaps. At a systematic level, the
Copyright Act is not constructed to address ex ante the welter of circumstances involving
uses of copyrighted works. Besides a few very detailed, but mostly industry-based,
exemptions, the Copyright Act is written at such a high level of generality that many of the
key concepts are often too indefinite to inform the public as to whether an anticipated use
is infringing, fair use, or otherwise permitted. To be sure, some cases of blatant
infringement and commercial piracy are easy to tell. But, by the very way Congress has
drafted the Copyright Act, many gray areas and gaps are necessarily created for the
myriad of ways and settings in which copyrighted works can be used.") (notes omitted).
129.
See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2000).
130.
See Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1227 (D. Minn.
2008) ('While the Court does not discount Plaintiffs' claim that, cumulatively, illegal
downloading has far-reaching effects on their businesses, the damages awarded in this case
are wholly disproportionate to the damages suffered by Plaintiffs. Thomas allegedly
infringed on the copyrights of 24 songs-the equivalent of approximately three CDs,
costing less than $54, and yet the total damages awarded is $222,000-more than five
hundred times the cost of buying 24 separate CDs and more than four thousand times the
cost of three CDs. While the Copyright Act was intended to permit statutory damages that
are larger than the simple cost of the infringed works in order to make infringing a far less
attractive alternative than legitimately purchasing the songs, surely damages that are
more than one hundred times the cost of the works would serve as a sufficient deterrent.").
131.
See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2000).
132.
Content is protected from its creation, although formalities are still useful. See
17 U.S.C. §§ 408, 410-11 (2000).
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successfully assert fair use in cases of transformative use. Usercopied content is content taken in its entirety from a source and made
available online; peer-to-peer filesharing of music or films would fit
this category. While prima facie infringement of the reproduction
right takes place in such situations, fair use might also apply. Under
one version of the doctrine, making content available in a different
form may constitute fair use,133 which is a somewhat different
application of the concept of transformativeness than that previously
associated with content creation.
The difficulties encountered in applying copyright to usergenerated content stem in part from the quantity of online use, and
from the problems with licensing on such a scale. There are also roots
in the privacy rights of passive users, who historically have remained
outside the reach of copyright. Before massive online reuse emerged,
amateur reuse would generally fall in or close to this private sphere
and be considered de minimis.1 34 The ability to make user-derived or
user-copied content available online has all but eliminated this
superposition: the amateur is no longer private. Normatively, the
question becomes whether the previous formal and informal
exemptions which applied to the amateur sphere should survive. This
in turn requires a reexamination of exceptions like fair use or safe
harbors, as well as a deeper understanding of the interests that those
exemptions are designed to protect.

133.
134.

See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
See supra note 35 and accompanying text.

